Usually, yes. A screenshot gets into evidence when someone who saw the original page or message testifies that this image accurately reflects what they saw. That's the whole test under Federal Rule of Evidence 901: a witness lays a foundation, the court accepts the testimony, the screenshot comes in.
Getting it admitted is the easy part. Getting a jury or a judge to actually believe it is a separate problem, and that's where most disputes over screenshot evidence really live.
Admissibility and weight are not the same question
Courts ask two different things about a piece of evidence. First: can this come in at all? Second: how much should anyone trust it? Lawyers call the second question "weight," and it's decided by the jury (or the judge, in a bench trial), not by a gatekeeping rule.
A screenshot clears the admissibility bar with almost no friction. Someone says "I took this, here's what it showed, here's when." That's testimony about a fact witnessed firsthand, and FRE 901(b)(1) covers exactly that: authentication through a witness with knowledge. No blockchain, no certificate, no special technology required. People authenticate screenshots this way in small claims court every day.
Weight is where it gets ugly. A screenshot is one of the easiest documents in the world to fake. Crop out the parts that don't help you. Edit the text in a browser's developer tools before capturing. Change your phone's clock, take the photo, change it back. None of that requires special skill, and opposing counsel knows it. Once a screenshot is in front of the jury, the fight shifts from "is this real" to "why should we believe it," and that fight can be lost even after the evidence has already been admitted.
What actually makes a screenshot more believable
None of these fixes admissibility. Admissibility was never the hard part. They go to weight, and weight is what wins or loses the argument in front of a fact-finder.
Capture close to the event, not the dispute. A screenshot taken the day a message was sent looks different to a jury than one taken the week before trial. Contemporaneous capture removes the easiest attack: that the page has since changed and you're showing something that never existed in that form.
Capture the whole page, not a crop. Include the URL bar. Include a visible date or timestamp if the platform shows one. A tight crop around just the damaging text invites the question of what got left out of frame, and there's rarely a good answer to that question at trial.
Be ready to testify, or find someone who can. FRE 901(b)(1) needs a person, not a file. If you can't say under oath what you captured and when, the screenshot has nobody standing behind it.
Capture the source, not a rendering of the source. A screenshot of a text message thread on your own phone is one step removed from the message itself. A screenshot of someone else's screen-share of that same thread is two steps removed, and each step is another place for a challenge to land. Where you can reach the original, prefer it.
What a hash anchor changes, and what it doesn't
Here's where a blockchain timestamp fits, and it's a narrower job than people assume. Take the SHA-256 hash of a screenshot file the day you capture it, then anchor that hash to a public blockchain. Now anyone, including opposing counsel, can check whether the file they're looking at today matches the file that existed on that date. If the hash lines up, nothing in the file has changed since the anchor. If it doesn't, something has.
That's a real fact, and it closes off a real line of attack: the claim that the screenshot was doctored after the fact, or that today's copy isn't the same file from back then. What it does not do is authenticate the screenshot. It doesn't establish that you're the one who took it, or that the page displayed what the screenshot shows, or that the capture wasn't staged in the first place. A person still has to testify to those facts. The anchor backs up the testimony after it's given; it doesn't replace the need to give it.
Think of it as evidence about the evidence. The screenshot proves what a page said. The hash anchor proves that specific screenshot file hasn't been touched since a given date. Neither one does the other's job, and treating a timestamp as a substitute for a witness is a mistake that gets caught the first time someone cross-examines it.
The practical version
If you're the one capturing something that might end up in a dispute: get the full page, get the URL and any visible timestamp, capture it as close to the event as you can, and be prepared to say who took it and when. Anchor the hash if you want a record that survives arguments about later tampering. Do all of that and a screenshot holds up about as well as this kind of evidence ever does.
Skip all of it and you're left arguing weight with nothing behind you but "trust me." Courts let that argument in. Juries don't have to believe it.